Never send a natural scientist to do a theologian's job.
I have grounds to ignore this fellow altogether, because he is committing the methodological equivalent of kicking the soccer ball into the sidelines and calling it a goal. Natural Science does not answer questions of purpose. Instead it answers descriptive questions only. A biologist, chemist, or any of the other empirical branches of science relies upon physical data and experiment to analyze certain patterns in behavior, given certain circumstances. Metaphysics, which comprises part of theology, answers the "why" questions: Why do we exist? Why do we commit acts of cruelty? And so forth.
He is well within his bounds to speak of causal relationships, however. His research concerning certain "empathy centers" in the brain might prove germane to metaphysicians or theologians at some later point. However, his misconduct lies in the fact that he makes the leap into metaphysics. He argues that evil itself can be reduced to this "lack of empathy." That is, people lack a certain skill at understanding other people's emotions. The implicit assumption is that, given proper treatment, most people will learn empathy and cease to do evil.
The only information that his research shows is that certain people's brains don't fire like other people's brains, and this anomaly correlates to a lack of empathy.
He not only fails to achieve his goal because he uses inadequate methods, but his definition is deficient. Because he is only concerned with the empirically verifiable, interpersonal dimension of evil, he speaks of it in terms of subjective preferences:
"We've inherited [the word "evil"]...and we use it to express our abhorrence when people do awful things, usually acts of cruelty, but I don't think it's anything more than another word for doing something bad. And as a scientist that doesn't seem to me to be much of an explanation. So I've been looking for an alternative -- we need a new theory of human cruelty."This is not a new idea, but stems from a philosophical system called Emotivism. In other words, he claims that no objective standard of evil exists, either from God, from Natural Law, or both. Instead, evil is just a term that people use when they really dislike a certain behavior or thought. For the strict empiricist, this is about the best system that they have at their disposal. However, it doesn't cut the metaphysical mustard.
This definition fails to address any other variables that the metaphysical definition includes. What about natural disasters? Are these evil, or just an inconvenience? What about diseases? Cold-blooded, pre-meditated murders? Victimless crimes? Are these evil? Are they merely another sort of sickness? Not only does his definition not address these issues, but it implicitly ignores the other facets of the metaphysical definition in order to legitimate his own.
Another philosophy which underpins his scientific results is Materialism. Materialists reject the notion of any soul or spirit in the human person. The mind and brain are one and the same. For this reason, he seeks to explain the "drive to respond appropriately" in terms of firing synapses. Man is a sort of machine; if the wires work correctly, then the machine runs effectively.
This raises several questions: What constitutes a malfunction? Who determines the nature of a malfunction? What about people who do not have this malfunction, yet still commit cruelty? As you can see, his usage of materialist and emotivist philosophies is not only inadequate to answer most permutations, but it is also highly unoriginal. B.F. Skinner developed his Behaviorist philosophy along Materialist lines, whereas A. J. Ayer utilized Emotivist philosophy in his Language, Truth, and Logic.
In the next article, I will put forward other philosophical views regarding evil, views which I might not personally agree with, but will most likely prove more satisfactory than Baron-Cohen's hackneyed view.
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